Social Capital, R&D and Industrial Districts by Massimiliano Mazzanti et al.
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 




Social Capital, R&D and Industrial 
Districts 
Giulio Cainelli, Susanna Mancinelli  
and Massimiliano Mazzanti 
 












KTHC - Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital 
 
 
Giulio Cainelli, University of Bari and CERIS-CNR 
 Susanna Mancinelli and Massimiliano Mazzanti, Economics Institutions and Territory, 

















The main idea behind this paper is that social capital is not, as generally suggested by 
the socio-economic literature, an individual attitude towards something which does not 
imply privately appropriable economic benefits. Actually, SC might and should be 
interpreted as a public component of an investment which implies private and public 
benefits entangled with each other. In order to put forward this idea, a dynamic 
theoretical model that assumes social capital as the public component of the impure 
public good R&D is developed. It shows that the ‘civic culture’ of the district area in 
which the firm works is not sufficient as an incentive to increase its investment in social 
capital, because this investment strictly depends on the economic convenience of 
investing in the impure public good. Social capital /networking dynamics might 
positively and complementarily evolve only if the opportunity cost of investing in 
innovation is sufficiently low. We consequently focus our attention on a specialized 
industrial district located in the Emilia Romagna region – the biomedical district of 
Mirandola (Modena) – characterised by a strong pattern of innovative activity. Using a 
proxy for innovative activity as dependant variable, we observe that R&D and 
networking/social capital arise as complementary driving forces for innovation outputs. 
When empirical evidence confirms that this complementarity plays a key role, and 
consequently strong links exist between market and non-market dynamics relating to 
firms, the role for policy actions targeted to social capital is larger. The policy effort 
should be targeted toward both market and non-market characteristics taken together, 
rather than solely to the production of (local) public goods (social capital) or innovation 
inputs as independent elements of firm processes. The input of SC alone is not sufficient 
to ensure innovation and growth: economic incentives matter. On the other hand, 
whenever SC dynamics are crucial for R&D private investments, the effect of economic 
incentives depends on the presence and degree of their complementarity. 
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1.  Introduction 
The main idea behind this paper is that social capital (SC hereafter) is not, as generally 
suggested by the socio-economic literature, an individual attitude towards something which does 
not imply privately appropriable economic benefits, as it is for a pure public good. Actually, SC 
might and should be interpreted as a component of an investment which implies private and 
public benefits entangled with each other.   
In order to put forward this idea, a dynamic theoretical model is developed, that assumes SC 
as a public component of an impure public good: i.e. R&D. This theoretical model shows that, 
assuming complementarity between SC and R&D, the ‘civic culture’ of an industrial district is 
not sufficient as an incentive, to increase investments in SC by any single firm joining the 
district, because this investment also depends on the economic convenience in investing in 
R&D.  
The subsequent empirical analysis allows us to assess the degree of such complementarity 
between SC and R&D, in a specific district-based industrialised context, using original survey 
data. In particular, we focus our attention on a Marshallian industrial district located in the 
Emilia Romagna region – the biomedical district of Mirandola (Modena) – which is 
characterised by strong innovative activity. Using original survey data on firm innovation 
practices, investment strategies, and cooperation efforts concerning firm relationship and 
networking within and outside the district, a complementary positive effect between SC and 
R&D investments is detected, estimating different econometric specifications of an innovation 
equation.  
A main conclusion of the paper is that if and only if the economic conditions, which 
determine a favourable environment for the investment in the impure public good, improve, 
investments in SC by  district firms are likely to increase. SC/networking dynamics may only 
positively evolve if the opportunity cost of investing in innovation is sufficiently low.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we comment on and describe some of the 
main results of the recent SC literature. The most relevant definitions are presented and 
discussed. Hence a conceptual framework for SC is provided, essentially based on the concept 
of ‘intensity of networking activities’ concerning network-involved agents. The framework 
largely draws upon works of impure public good production and non-cooperative agreements. 
In section three, a theoretical model is presented, wherein the accumulation of SC is assumed as 
the public component of the impure public capital R&D, and the main implications of the 
  2model are discussed. In section four, we present our empirical exercise. Estimating an 
innovation equation, we detect a positive rapport between the intensity of SC (measured by a 
firm’s specific index of cooperative intensity within the district) and the level of innovative 
actions observed. Moreover, R&D and SC/networking arises as complementary driving forces 
behind innovative activity. The last section concludes the paper.   
 
2.  Social capital: a framework for theoretical and empirical analysis   
 
The main problem concerning the economic analysis of what has been termed ‘SC’ is that the 
literature is strongly heterogeneous, and the notion of SC is not always clearly assessed and 
described to be operative on theoretical and applied grounds. This is probably caused by the 
past emphasis on inter-disciplinary research, which has characterised the SC arena over the 
nineties, and was definitely necessary in the initial phase to generate a conceptual and theoretical 
debate. Some definitions are nevertheless too sociologically biased; others are still too vague. 
Our first goal was thus to extract from the literature the definitions we retain consistent, then 
present our own framework. 
Among the various definitions we came across in the literature, the following are the most 
relevant for defining the boundaries of the issue in question: (i) “A variety of different entities 
with two factors in common: they all consist of some aspects of social structure, and they 
facilitate certain actions – whether personal or corporate actors – within the structure” 
(Coleman, 1988); (ii) “Those features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks 
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinate actions” (Putnam, 1993); (iii) 
“A glue that holds societies together” (Serageldin, 1996). 
Taking into account the above definitions, SC is possibly identifiable with the ‘culture’ of a 
group of agents, a culture of economic reciprocity and cooperation. More generally, two key 
issues arise up from the socio-economic literature, those of ‘trust’ and ‘ease of cooperation’. 
Paldam (2000) specifically provides meanings revolving around the notion of trust, 
cooperation and network. The author correctly defines SC as the glue generating excess 
cooperation; we here add ‘in excess’ with respect to an equilibrium intended in a Cournot-Nash 
meaning. Trust and ease of cooperation are two factors that simultaneously interact in the 
production of private and public goods, or forms of capital. 
We argue it is essential to move away from ‘associative’ based concepts of SC as presented in 
Robison et al. (2002) and Putnam (1993), and from analysis of trust and cooperation relying on 
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intangible capital stock with some public good-like properties worth investigating further.  
Theoretically speaking, SC may be included in a production function together with other 
inputs, linked with them to a different degree of complementarity. The effects of SC must be 
therefore analysed according to the shape of cost functions, returns to scale, factor productivity, 
market and shadow prices of capital investments.  
A contingent definition of SC emerges strictly linked to the concepts of trust and 
cooperation presented above: SC is an intermediate capital good privately and intentionally 
produced, which endogenously accumulates from the flow of agents investments in voluntary 
cooperative effort. SC might be also conceived as the stock of the public component of an 
impure-public good, sustained by a set of private incentives. Its ‘production’ and accumulation 
are self-enforcing and sustained by reciprocal benefits of cooperation (Mancinelli and Mazzanti, 
2004; Galassi and Mancinelli, 2004).  
It is clear that the above definition hints at a microeconomic approach, differentiating the 
present analysis from that mostly found in the literature so far. It thus lies within the ‘narrow’ 
definition of SC, following the World Bank (1997) terminology for microeconomic approaches1, 
in opposition to wider meso and macro approaches.  
As far as the capital-like properties are concerned, SC as defined above has a transformation 
capacity, in the sense that its accumulation is targeted toward the production of other forms of 
capital (man made or organizational) or final outputs2. It endures as long as incentives exist to 
sustain it. In our case, the degree of durability is such that the stock elapses with the cooperative 
agreements established for specific objectives. Then, the breaking down of a coalition ends the 
value of the stock. Furthermore, SC accumulates or de-cumulates depending on the structure of 
individual incentives (benefits and costs), and it is subject to decay as a renewable ‘collective 
resource’. In fact, decay depends on endogenous factors such as easy riding (non consistent 
                                                           
1 Wherein SC is included and studied as the ‘missing link’, or residual and intangible capital factor, in explaining 
growth and development of economic systems. This is the ‘orthodox’ approach to SC within economics. SC is the 
fourth form of capital, after man made, natural and human capital, in other words the ‘glue’ that (i) may enhance 
other factor’s productivity, (ii) reduces problems associated to ‘common property resources’ and (iii) generically 
helps development to occur on a sustainable basis (Cote and Healy, 2001). For a heterodox view on SC see Fine 
(2001).  
2 The definition of SC as a stock of intangibles is not a completely shared vision. For instance, Arrow (1999) and 
Solow (1999) sharply conclude that the emphasis on capital is probably misplaced. SC derives instead from an 
association to the concept of human capital. In their view, the fact that factors such as trust, cooperativeness, and 
propensity to invest in a common effort have on the one hand a clear cut effect on total productivity, but on the 
other hand economics cannot consistently deal with SC as a proper form of capital. Other authors (Stiglitz, 1999) 
are more in favour of the SC consistency within economics.  
  4actions of investment between agents) and on exogenous factors; investment flows are thus 
necessary to maintain the stock. Contrary to Sandler’s analysis of intergenerational club goods 
(Sandler, 1982 and 1992), depreciation occurs because of a lack of strategic investment (reduced 
investment) in cooperation at any time t, rather than as a direct consequence of capital ‘use’ 
(crowding externality). In other words, depreciation derives from ‘non use’ rather than excessive 
use, as for many forms of collective manmade capital. Depreciation reflects the fact that much 
of SC investment is community-network specific.  
The only capital-like property SC lacks is alienability, since we have shown that the stock of 
SC is intrinsically a relational dependent stock, consistent with Coleman’s vision. It is not owned 
by individual agents or by the agents as a group, it is ‘asset specific’ and an instrument for the 
alliance purposes. Nevertheless, we argue that ‘inalienability’ is the main specificity of SC 
indented as an intangible real asset. Inalienability is linked to non-marketability, in that agents 
invest in some imperfectly observable assets: in respect to investment decisions, costliness and 
imperfect observability are the main factors responsible for the systemic easy riding. Thus, in 
respect to our definition, is SC a real form of (intangible) capital? We believe it is.  
Moreover, in the definition proposed above SC is not simply considered as a public good, 
but  as the public component of an impure public good3, in which agents invest. 
For instance, the environment faced by firms located within an industrial district may be 
depicted as follows: on the one hand, a firm has the option of investing either in standard 
technology or in incremental innovations which do not require cooperative efforts (the firm 
internalises investments and associated returns). Both options may be termed as ‘Business as 
Usual’ (BAU) scenarios. On the other hand, the firm may invest in R&D which implies 
innovations that involve structural breaks from the BAU (discrete changes concerning 
technological/organisational development) and that involve the concepts of skill, knowledge 
and competences, which are only partially owned by the firm. In this case, the innovation 
change usually requires a cooperative effort, and the investment may be thought of as one in an 
impure public good, that is each unit of investment produces some percentage units of private 
                                                           
3 In the economic literature, an impure public good, or mixed-public good, is a good which jointly gives private and 
public benefits. A typical example is that of an individual who, by being inoculated against an infectious disease, 
confers both a private benefit on himself and a public benefit by reducing the risk of spreading the disease through 
the community. In this case inoculation is the impure public good.  The definition of impure public good well 
applies “to an activity like philanthropy, where charitable activities provide private as well as public benefits to 
contributors” (Cornes and Sandler, 1984, p. 580). “The acquisition of certain types of education is often asserted to 
have benefits for society at large, in addition to purely private benefits generated for students. […] The acts of 
charity and of saving and the activities of military alliances are a few of the many instances that have been claimed as 
examples of the joint production of both a public and a  private benefits.” (Cornes and Sandler, 1986, p. 115). 
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technological amelioration appropriable by the firm and public benefits derive from the 
cooperative agreements among firms. 
The framework highlights the fundamental need for agents to join their efforts to achieve 
benefits which derive from and build on public-like forms of investments. The most common 
and relevant benefit deriving from firm cooperation is that associated to the development of 
technological (process and product-based) innovations. This necessary joint effort to establish 
voluntary cooperative schemes, to achieve goals specific to the network but appropriable by 
participants, characterises most forms of (i) voluntary agreements, (ii) inter-firms intra district 
cooperation, (iii) inter-firms inter-districts cooperation. The relevance of points (i)-(iii) as 
engines for innovation and growth at a regional level has increased over the last decades, 
following both the less prominent role of the State as ‘regulator’ (top down approach), and the 
reshaping of governance and business strategies within the post-fordist society. Indeed socio-
economic changes occurring in the post fordist (post-industrial) era shift the focus of interest 
from man made forms of capital to human, environmental and SC assets. Furthermore, market 
and non-market ‘horizontal’ networks play a major role with respect to ‘vertical’ and hierarchical 
relationships, creating a new scenario described by a cultural change in local and national 
production. The community benefits from positive network externalities. Nevertheless, in 
contrast o pure exogenous spillovers, the voluntary and intentional production of joint social 
benefits is costly: therefore incentives are crucial. 
 The public element of welfare function of one firm participating in the network agreement 
is, in our framework, the stock of SC on which the decision of action relies. SC is nevertheless 
strictly connected to private components of welfare (it is not a pure ‘independent’ public good), 
by a complementarity relationship. 
It is worth underlining the voluntary element of the agreements in cooperation and 
production: SC is self-enforcing, self-financing, in opposition to third-party enforcement 
frameworks. Thus, we may say that our SC environment belongs to a Coasian-like framework 
characterised by horizontal relationships, in opposition to third-party enforcement pigouvian-
like institutional frameworks. 
As far as the measurement of SC is concerned, there are three main ways of approaching SC 
quantification at microeconomic level4: by using (i) regional/national official datasets; (ii) 
                                                           
4 We do not follow the macro-economic direction, which has dominated until recently the empirical measurement 
of SC, for two reasons. First, the conceptual focus is here strictly microeconomic. Secondly, the weaknesses of that 
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by observing choices (i.e. investment choices, participation rates, etc.); (iii) stated preferences 
methods (directly revealing behaviour when observation is difficult or we lack behavioural 
‘tracks’), which include quantifying SC by direct methods (i.e. interviewing economic agents). 
The main obstacle in using the first method, generally less costly, is that SC features are 
usually non-market and non-accounted in regional and national dataset5. Thus, the only 
consistent way to elicit the SC private and public characteristics is often by implementing 
survey-based approaches aimed at eliciting specific information by structured questionnaires. 
The questionnaire should attempt to gather information consistent with conceptual definitions, 
by recovering data on SC factors, R&D dynamics and other firm-specific factors possibly 
affecting innovation, which we may use as “control” variables.  
The next sections present (i) the theoretical model, which further defines the conceptual 
environment of the work, then (ii) the empirical investigation of the relationship between R&D 
and SC and their role in fostering innovation.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
research direction (specifically the weak conceptual framework for SC) have recently been extensively highlighted 
by various authors, who claim the greater added value of a microeconomic applied research direction (Sobel, 2002; 
Durlauf, 2004; 2002).  
5 For this reason, most studies on SC using official data adopt SC proxies, which lack robustness in terms of 
conceptual and /or theoretical foundations. See, among the others, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2000) who 
introduce some ad hoc SC proxies as determinants of financial development. 
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3.  The model  
In the analysis set out in the previous section, SC does not emerge as an individual attitude 
towards something which implies only public benefits; by contrast, SC emerges as the public 
component of an investment which implies a share of privately appropriable benefits6. 
The aim of this section is to analyse the accumulation of SC by district firms, through the 
development of a dynamic theoretical model where SC is assumed to be the public component 
of an impure public good – the R&D investment –  following the example depicted above. 
The analysis builds up and brings together the contributions given by Cornes and Sandler 
(1984, 1986) and Glaeser et al. (2002), in an attempt to shape an original framing.  
 
3.1 Firms belonging to an industrial district 
We assume that there exists an industrial district composed of N  firms7. Each firm invests in 
two kinds of capital, yi and Ri. yi has mere private characteristics and Ri has the characteristics of 
an impure public good. It has (produces) either a private characteristic, zi (which has no effects 
on the other firms) and a public characteristic, si (which has effects also on the other districts 
firms). 
The investment in the private kind of capital, yi, can represent an investment in a BAU 
(‘business as usual’) capital stock, and the investment in the ‘impure public’ capital8, Ri, can 
represent an investment in R&D. In this case we can take as example of the private component, 
zi, the technological amelioration appropriable by the firm, and as example of the ‘public 
component’, si, the formation of voluntary and self enforcing agreements among firms. 
Therefore, the public component, si, is consistent with the definition of SC presented in 
section two. Actually, si is an intermediate capital good produced privately and intentionally, 
which endogenously accumulates from the flow of agents investments in voluntary cooperative 
effort; and it is also the public component of an impure-public good.  
Since Ri has the characteristic of an impure public good, each unit of investment by the firm i 
in Ri is such that: 
(1)      i i i R z α =              0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 given 
                                                           
6 The idea that investment in SC is linked to economic factors, which imply private benefits, has already been 
investigated in other works (Galassi, 2001). 
7 Each firm is indexed by the subscript i=1,..., N. 
8 Notice that we do not deal with club goods because here the size of the community (network) consuming the 
public good is exogenously fixed. This characteristic (community size) does not appear explicitly in the analysis. 
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Where αi and βi are exogenously given coefficients reflecting a simple process, whereby zi 
and si are jointly generated in fixed proportion by the investment in Ri. 
We are hence assuming that whenever a firm invests in one unit of Ri, she invests in 1/αi 
given units of a private characteristic and in 1/βI  given units of SC9. That is whenever a firm 
invests in one unit of Ri, her investment is to percent an investment in a private asset and to 
some percent an investment in SC.   
Moreover, since si exerts effects also on the other firms inside the industrial district and vice 
versa, we define: 






j i R s S β    ∀ i, j    
and:  






i S s R s S ≠
= =
+ ∑ = ∑ = =
1 1
β
The whole quantity of the public characteristic (S) is given by the sum of the single 
contributions by any firm. 
We adopt the Nash-Cournot assumption that the single firm i regards S≠i as exogenously 
given. 
From equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) the investment of firm i in one unit of Ri has therefore 
three effects: (i) an increase in i's private benefits due to the private characteristic, zi (=αiRi); (ii) 
an increase in the total amount of the public component available to any firm inside the network 
( ); (iii) an increase in i's private benefits due to the public characteristic ( ).  i i S s S ≠ + = i i S s ≠ +
Hence, we can define firm i's benefit function of the investment in the impure public capital, 
Ri as: 
 
(5)     () [ ]
i R i i i i i I z s S B B , , + = ≠      ∀i  
and, from equations (1) and (2)  it can be written as:  
 
(6)     () [ ]
i R i i i i i i i I R S R B B , ,α β ≠ + =    ∀i  
                                                           
9 Notice that, by equation (2) we assume that si can never be zero, because we suppose that each firm inside the 
district invests at least a minimum positive amount in ''networking'' and establishes even the simplest form of 
contacts or agreement.  We are, hence, assuming that district firms are already investing in SC. 
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Since, from equation (6) firm i's benefit function depends on the firm i's choice concerning 
the  investment Ri-related flow variable ( ), on the consequent choice on the stock variable 
(R
i R I
i) and on the other firms choice concerning S≠i, it can also be expressed as follows: 
 
(7)    () [ ] ( ) [ ]
i R i i i i i i i R i i i i I R S R B I z s S B , , , , α β ≠ ≠ + = +  
        [ ] i i R i i S I R V ≠ = , , ,      ∀i  
We assume that firm i’s benefit function is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly quasi-
concave, and twice differentiable with respect to all its arguments. 
We can define the investment cost function of any firm i regarding the impure public capital 
Ri as:  
 
(8)        ∀i   ) (
i R i i I C C =
with  , and  .  0 (.)
' ≥ i C 0 (.)
' ' ≥ i C
Since the variation of Ri stock in time is: 
 
(9)   i R i
i R I R
t
R
i δ − = =
∂
∂ •
   ∀i 
 
where δ is the exogenous depreciation factor, we can write the firm's investment cost function 
in Ri as: 
(10)        ∀i    ) ( i i i i R R C C δ + =
•
Moreover we assume that firms are symmetric: they have identical investment cost functions, 
and we assume that the opportunity cost of the impure public capital Ri is r (that is the value of 
the private capital, yi). 
From equations (7), (9) and (10), the problem of each district firm can be expressed as the 
typical problem of the determination of the optimal control path ( ) and of the optimal 
state path ( ).  
) ( * t I i R
) (
* t Ri
Since we have assumed that Ri is an impure public capital, that is it jointly produces a private 
characteristic, zi, and a public characteristic, si, we can assert, following Cornes and Sandler 
  10(1984, 1986), that the two characteristics, zi and si, are complements.  Therefore an increase in 
one of the two characteristics  increases the benefits of increasing the other (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1995). In terms of mixed-partial derivatives of firm i’s benefit function, 
complementarity between zi and si can be expressed as: 











3.2 The accumulation of social capital inside an industrial district 
  We assume that each firm inside the industrial district has a known lifespan of T periods 
and that she discounts the future with the discount factor ρ. 
  Each firm wants to maximise her net benefit function10, in the interval of time [0, T]:  
Maximize    [] () {} dt e I rC S I R V
t
T





s.t:     
i i R i R I R δ − =
•
. 
Where the transversality conditions are:  , R i i R R
_
) 0 ( = i(T) free ( , T given), and λ(T)=0.  i R
_
From equation (2) and (7)  firm i’s problem may be expressed also as: 
Maximize  () [] ( ) {} dt e I rC I R S s B
t
T
i R i i R i i i i i
ρ α
−
≠ ∫ − +
0
, ,  
s.t.: 
i i R i R I R δ − =
•
. 
The Hamiltonian is: 
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ρ − + − + =
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λ ), we 
get11: 
                                                           
10 For each firm, Ri is the state variable and IRi is the control variable. 
11 The analytical steps to get equation (12) are shown in Appendix 1. 
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Equation (13) represents, the optimal control path ( ).   ) ( * t I i R
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That is, in each period t firm i's optimal level of investment in Ri decreases at the increasing 
of the opportunity cost of Ri. 
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β β , which is certainly non-positive, since we have 
assumed the strictly quasi-concavity of firm i’s benefit function. 
The sign of the term that appears in the square bracket at the denominator in equation (15) 
depends on the sign of  ) (
i s R i i
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certainly non-positive,   is nonnegative, since we have assumed that z
i s R i B i and si are 










Since the technological parameters, αi and βi, are 
                                                           
12 Remind that:  i i i R s β =  and  .  i i S s S ≠ + =
  12independently determined, one cannot rule out the possibility that  .
i s S i i
i s R i i B B β α >  In this 
way, complementarity between zi and si can produce, in each period t, a positive response: 






Hence, in the case depicted above ( ), the reaction curve may have positive 
slope: in this case, an increase in S
0 / > ≠i i dS ds
≠i raises firm i’s benefits due to the public characteristic 
(si+S≠i), which, in turn, rises the single firm's marginal valuation for the complementary private 
characteristic zi. As a consequence, the single firm now wishes to increase her investment in Ri. 
To do this, the single firm must increase her stock of Ri, which has the effect of increasing si (via 
si= βiRi), her own generation of the public characteristic (SC). 
The conclusion is that if the other firms' investment in SC (S≠i) increases, also the single firm 
i’s investment in SC may increase. Hence a positive ‘culture’ in an industrial district may have 
positive effects on the investment of SC by the single firm. 
But the increases of the investment in si pass through firm i's investment in Ri. 
And from equation (14) we know that in each period t firm i's optimal level of investment in 
Ri decreases at the increasing of the opportunity cost of Ri. 
Hence, whenever the opportunity cost of Ri increases, the single firm i reduces her 
investment in Ri and, as a consequence, she reduces her investment in SC. 
From the third maximum principle conditions (equation of motion for Ri,  ) we 
get
λ ∂ ∂ =
•
/ H Ri
13 the optimal state path: 
(17)  
δ δ
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* I i R
(18)   ) 1 ( ) (
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* t i R t
i i e
I
e R t R
δ δ
δ
− − − + =  
From the results of the model we can deduce that if SC is the public component of an 
impure public capital, an increase of the other firms' investment in the public component (SC) 
may induce firm i to increase her own investment of the impure public capital Ri, and, as a 
consequence, to increase her own investment of SC (si). If we consider high levels of 
                                                           
13 The analytical steps to get equation (17) are shown in Appendix 2. 
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district, the result of the model confirms what part of the literature on SC14 asserts. That is, the 
level of investment in SC by an individual economic agent is positively boosted by the civic 
culture of the geographic area in which the economic agent acts.  
Nevertheless, as shown above, this virtuous circle happens only when the opportunity cost 
of the impure public capital is sufficiently low: if the opportunity cost of Ri is too high, the 
single firm will not increase her investment in Ri, and as a consequence, will not increase her 
investment in SC, even if the availability of SC provided by the other firms is high. 
Hence, if SC is definable as the public component of an impure public capital, the ‘civic 
culture’ of the district area to which the firm belongs is not sufficient to increase her investment 
in SC, because this investment depends also on the economic profitability in investing in the 
impure public capital. This is true for each firm inside the industrial district. Therefore, the 
whole level of investment in SC inside the district tend to be correlated to the costs of the 
economic actions. In the case depicted above, the higher the opportunity costs of R&D 
(conversely, the lower the profitability of innovation), the lower the stock level of SC. 
As a conclusion, if and only if the economic conditions, which determine a favourable 
environment to the investment in the impure public capital, improve, it is possible to expect an 
increase of the investments in SC by economic agents. If SC is assessed as the public 
component of an impure public good which is a crucial intermediate capital good for firm 
performance and innovation practices, the incentive devices to invest in SC are also economic-
biased, and they are not only linked to the ‘civic culture’ of the geographic area. 
The aim of the following empirical analysis is to test the assumption of complementarity 
between SC and R&D in a specific Italian industrial district: the biomedical district of Mirandola 
(Modena).  It is worth noting that the applied analysis is meant to be a first empirical test, 
circumscribed to the district under investigation, without the attempt of achieving any 
generalisation of results.  A larger dataset referring to a sufficient number of industrial districts, 
                                                           
14 We refer to that line of analysis which mainly stems from the famous contributions associated to the work of 
Fukuyama (1995) and Putnam (1993). The latter is indeed famous for a study on SC taking Italy as case study. The 
interest of both approaches is on ‘culture’ and ‘institutions’, but no attempt is made to analyse what the causes of 
SC formation and development are. The interest is here on effects and on comparative analyses between areas and 
regions. The main risk of this approach is to explain social phenomenon only by the (observed) status quo culture, 
with minor attention to economic and political dynamic elements. What often emerges from this approach to SC is 
that geographic areas in which investments in SC are low are typically characterised by a low level of ‘civic culture’. 
The reasons for which this happens are not explored and, as a consequence, the economic incentives behind the 
investments in SC are not investigated.  
  14and a panel structure would allow a more sophisticated econometric test. In this sense our 
empirical analysis is preliminary in scope, suggesting a direction for further research.  
 
4.  SC and R&D investments as complements: an empirical test 
 
4.1 The data-set 
 
The framework depicted above characterises different real-world situations where inter-firm 
cooperation is the primary and leading key to the successful performance of industrial districts. 
Along this line, networking is a capital good and an intermediate input to production. Although 
we underline that the present analysis is highly specific concerning the elicited data, recent works 
taking a similar perspective are, among the others, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), Becker and 
Dietz (2004), Fritsch and Franke (2004), Negassi (2004). These papers deal with innovation 
activities, R&D cooperation and (knowledge) spillovers, taking different perspectives and 
research directions. Summing up, they attempt to identify what the determinants of R&D 
intensity, R&D cooperation and innovation activities are, by specifying diverse reduced forms15. 
Building on that research, we here attempt to focus attention on the nexus of complementarity 
between networking and R&D as joint inputs for technological innovation.    
Now let us show how we prepared and designed the case study analysis for the biomedical 
industrial district of Mirandola (Modena). The empirical identification of the manufacturing 
firms belonging to this industrial district was carried out taking into account two different 
dimensions: (i) productive specialization and (ii) geographic area in which firms are located. In 
regards to productive specialization, all the manufacturing firms belonging to the ATECO 
classes 33.1016 (Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances) were included 
in the sample. Concerning the localization area of the district, we took into consideration the 
following seven municipalities of the Provincia of Modena17: Mirandola, Medolla, Concordia, 
Cavezzo, San Felice sul Panaro, San Possidonio and San Prospero. The reason behind this 
choice is that these municipalities are associated with a concentration of biomedical firms. We 
identified the ‘biomedical district of Mirandola’ by taking into account only those firms that 
                                                           
15 Becker and Dietz (2004) estimate reduced forms for input and output innovation measures regressed over R&D 
cooperation and networking proxies. Fritsch and Franke (2004) use patent datasets to estimate the effect of both 
R&D intensity and R&D regional spillovers. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) try instead to use R&D cooperation as 
dependant variable, explained by spillovers measures. Negassi (2004) exploits information concerning the budget 
spent on  R&D cooperation and turnover based innovation measures.  
16 Economic activity classes defined by the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). 
  15satisfied the following requirements: (i) operating in the sector 33.10 Manufacture of medical and 
surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances and (ii) headquarters are located in one of the seven 
municipalities already listed.    
We then identified a universe population of district firms that was identified during an 
extensive research project carried out years ago on this district (Baracchi and Bigarelli, 2001)18. 
Interviews were held with firm managers over a two-months period (February-March 2004) on 
administering a short but structured questionnaire, in order to elicit data on innovation practice, 
R&D investment, and cooperation efforts concerning firm’s relationship and networking within 
and outside the local district. The selected period of reference is 2000-2002. As far as R&D data 
is concerned, it was reasonably possible to ask firms for annual data covering the years 2000 to 
2002, while all questions regarding networking activities and innovation practices were set to 
determine a ‘trend’ over the 2000-2002 period19. We decided not to elicit information on 
performance to minimise the rejection rate; furthermore, survey data on performance is known 
to often lack reliability. The first section of the questionnaire deals with general features of 
firms, the second section focuses on innovation practice, the third section on networking 
activities. The final dataset accounts for 40 of the 70 firms making up the district ‘population’. 
Some firms refused to take part, most of the data losses derived from firm shutdowns, especially 
smaller establishments. As it turns out from Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in Appendix 3, the 
coverage rate of our dataset appears to be quite good. This is true both when considering all the 




4.2 The empirical analysis 
This section illustrates the econometric methodology used to empirically test the 
aforementioned complementarity between R&D and SC/networking. In order to perform this 
exercise, we estimate an innovation equation, which expresses the relationship between 
innovation output and innovation inputs within a ‘conceptual framework’ of a knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
17 Modena is a central Province of the Emilia-Romagna Region. Emilia Romagna is an area of Italy characterised by 
a high density of industrial districts, a GDP per capita (about 27000€ in 2003) higher than the Italian average and 
with four millions residents represents the 7% of the Italian population.  
18 We argue that the main added value of current empirical analysis on SC may derive from focused survey study 
eliciting specific and often ‘latent’ information which are not accounted for in  market transaction and official data 
(i.e. Community Innovation Survey, national or regional statistics). With this respect, our analysis differs from 
studies using large, public but not focussed dataset (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2003).  
19 This is a key problem for empirical analysis concerning innovation and SC dynamics, since such data are 
difficulty, if not impossibly, revealed on an annual basis by firms.  
  16production function (Griliches, 1979; Fritsch and Franke, 2004). The estimable reduced form 
we use is: 
 
(19)                 
  
otherwise          0 INN
INN       if           1 INN
t 1,
1 1 , 2 1 , 1 0
*
t i, t i,
=
+ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = = − − i t i i t i u NET RD β α α α X
 
A brief description is necessary.   is a binary variable taking the value of 1 whether the 
firm  i introduced product and/or process technological innovations over the 2000-2002 
period
t i INN ,
20.    is the Research and Development expenditure per employee of firm i.  i RD
In order to cope with endogeneity, we decided to use the 2000 value as independent variable 
proxy for R&D.   is a variable capturing the networking effect concerning the SC oriented 
activity of firm i, which was addressed by a specific and focussed part of the questionnaire. 
More specifically, two different dummies are introduced: one is a specific proxy for SC, the 
other is a variable mainly capturing the information spillovers between district firms
i NET
21. The first 
takes the value of one when a firm is associated to formal or informal networking relationships, 
dealing with production issues, innovation issues and market strategies. The second dummy  
takes the value of one if a firm exploits other firms belonging to the same district (exchanging 
flows of critical information)22 as a main source of information. The vector   includes a set of 
control variables (firm’s typology, size, age, and export propensity) which we included to better 
specify the vector of innovation inputs. Otherwise, the effect of R&D and networking could be 
overestimated. Finally,   denotes the error term with the standard statistical properties. It is 
worth noting that all the explanatory variables are expressed in natural logarithms.  
i X
i u
Before showing and commenting the findings of the econometric investigation, we first 
present some results of the field survey (Tables 1 and 2) and then some descriptive statistics 
concerning the variables used (Table 3).   
 
                                                           
20 See Negassi (2004), among others, for a critical debate over the various innovation proxy measures, on the input 
and output side.  
21 We observe that this second networking variable is weaker as  SC proxy, compared to the first. It is included since 
it captures relevant firm networking aspects, mostly related to district-specific information spillovers. It may thus act 
as a sort of control variable, mitigating any problem of omitted information when the aim is to test the ‘direct’ effect 
of networking relationships.    
22 See Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) for a discussion on the role of incoming (information) spillovers as an engine 
for R&D cooperation and, indirectly, for innovation. 
  17Table 1 – Firm size and R&D 
Size 
classes  
Firms  Firms  Employees Employees R&D per employee  
  N. %  N.  %  € 
          
0-19 21  52.5  190  7.5  1,323 
20-49 10  25.0  257  10.1  530 
50-249 6  15.0  659  26.1  2,138 
>249 3  7.5  1,424  56.3  6,017 
Total 40  100.0  2,530  100.0  4,097 
 
 
Table 2 – Innovations and networking 
Size 
classes  





  % % % %  %  % 
          
0-19 90.9  38.0  38.0  57.1  85.7  28.6 
20-49 50.0  20.0  20.0  30.0 30.0  10.0 
50-249 100.0  83.3 83.3 83.3  100.0  0.0 
>249 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  66.6  33.3 
Total 60.0  45.0  45.0  60.0  72.5 20.0 
(a) This dummy takes value 1 if the firm is characterised by formal or informal networking relationships dealing with both production 
issues, innovation issues and market strategies.   
(b) This dummy takes value 1 if the firm exploits and receives critical information from agents belonging to the same district. 
 
From analysis of Tables 1 and 2 it emerges (i) that the percentage of innovative firms in this 
industrial district is quite high and, (ii) that this tendency increases in accordance with the firms’ 
size. Taking into account the first networking variable, one notes that also in this case a high 
percentage of district firms are involved. The second networking variable instead does not show 
the same pattern. In fact, this latter networking factor, with the exception of small-sized firms, 
seems to be less widespread.  
The  R&D per employee increases by size, confirming the expected positive correlation 
between the two variables. In comparison, the italian industrial R&D value (year 2000) elicited 
by the Third Community Innovation Survey is about 3000€ for only formalised R&D, and more 
than 8000€ including expenditures on innovative man-made capitals, skilled labour training and 
acquisitions of know-how. 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics (explanatory variables) 




   MIN. MAX. 
       
Log(employees)  40 2.996 1.435 0  6.526 
Firm Typology (a) 40 0.6  0.496 0  1 
Firm Age (years) 40  13.8  8.811  2  34 
Log(export/total turnover) in 2000  40 1.586 1.872 0  4.499 
  18Dummy networking (b) 40 0.725 0.452 0  1 
Dummy networking (c) 40 0.2  0.405 0  1 
Log(R&D expenditure/employees in 2000)   40 3.193 3.880 0  10.183 
(a) This dummy takes value 1 if the firm sells its products on the final market, 0 if the firm is primarily a sub-contractor.   
(b) This dummy takes value 1 if the firm is characterised by formal or informal networking relationships dealing with both 
production issues, innovation issues and market strategies.   
(c) This dummy takes value 1 if the firm exploits and receives critical information from agents belonging to the same district. 
 
From the econometric point of view, the equation (19) estimation poses at least three 
problems. First, heteroskedasticity, as is often found when cross sectional data are used, may 
reduce the efficiency of econometric estimates. Thus, all estimates are carried out adopting a 
‘robust’ estimator for the Logit model which addresses this source of bias. Secondly, there is a 
potential endogeneity of R&D in the regression. In fact, as many contributions have shown, a 
lagged impact effect between R&D input and innovation output is a general plausible 
assumption often verified by empirical assessment. We thus use the R&D data for 2000 as an 
explanatory factor for innovation over 2000-2002, introducing a ‘lagged’ term into the 
regression (thus specifying a hybrid cross sectional model)23.  Third, potential endogeneity may 
also affect the networking-related variables. According to some contributions on Italian 
industrial districts (Cainelli and Nuti, 1996; Brusco et al., 1996; Cainelli and Zoboli, 2004), this 
kind of formal and informal networking relationship, as well as information spillovers, may be 
interpreted as quasi-fixed factors of ‘production’, in any case slow evolving over time. This 
means that those variables can be considered as pre-determined factors, exogenous with respect 
to district firm innovative activity24.  
Let us now go back to the econometric findings. In Table 4, we report results for various 
specifications of (19). In particular, column [1] shows the reduced form when only control 
variables are included. In this case, all these explanatory variables result as non-significant. 
Focussing on the extended specifications [2-6] we note that the impact of R&D and 
networking as inputs of innovation is highly significant. It is worth highlighting two points. 
First, both the networking dummy variables are statistically significant when included separately 
as added covariate to the control variables of (19) (columns [2] and [5]). Secondly, the two 
‘inputs’ for which we hypotheses a complementarity nexus emerge statistically significant, when 
both are included (column [4] and [6]). This is an assessment of the joint/complementary 
driving stimulus provided by R&D and SC. Regressions [4] and [6] also shows the two highest 
                                                           
23 See Huselid and Becker (1996) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) for more insights on the issue.  
24 Similar considerations are put forward by Brynolfson et al., 2002 for organizational capital. 
  19pseudo-R2. Specifications [5-6] also show a significant effect of size. Size nevertheless does not 
arise a primary force behind innovation. 
We may conclude this section summarising the outcome of the econometric exercise. SC 
investments, proxied by two variables concerning networking activities, emerge as a crucial 
driving force for innovation. Innovation is also triggered by expenditures in R&D, confirming 
ex ante expectations. Furthermore, and more important, SC/networking and R&D arise jointly 
determining technological innovation. The outcome is robust as confirmed by different 
econometric specifications of an innovation equation. Those aforementioned driving forces 
appear to overwhelm the effect of other explanatory factors of innovation, like firm size, which 
is usually found as a key driving force of innovation and high-performance practices. Only in 
considering the second networking variable, the variable capturing the market orientation of 
firms, firm size results as statistically significant in the regression. This finding, although 
circumscribed to the district observed, is in contrast to the predominant size effects often 
emerging from studies on innovation practices, and with other evidence, which also tends to 
reduce the emphasis on R&D cooperation with respect to size, market share ad other firm-
specific characteristics (Negassi, 2004). Further empirical evidence is thus necessary for a 
generalisation of results.  
 
Table 4 – The innovation equation: estimates 
  Dependent variable: innovation dummy (2000-2002) 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
ESTIMATION METHOD L OGIT(1) LOGIT(1) LOGIT(1) LOGIT(1) LOGIT(1) LOGIT(1)
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  20Dummy networking (a)   …  2.350** 
[1.162] 
…  2.470** 
[1.063] 
… … 
        








in 2000  




…  0.354** 
[0.173] 
        
        
N. Obs.  40 40 40 40 40 40 
Pseudo-R2 0.196 0.299 0.293 0.388 0.363 0.469 
** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
(1) Standard errors [in brackets] are computed with the White method in order to correct for heteroschedasticity. 
(a)    This dummy takes value 1 if the firm is characterised by formal or informal networking relationships dealing with th 
production issues, innovation issues and market strategies.   
(b)  This dummy takes value 1 if the firm exploits and receives critical information from agents belonging to the same district.  
(c)  This dummy takes value 1 if the firm sells its products on the final market, 0 if the firm is primarily a sub-contractor.     
  
 
  215. Conclusions 
Building on the literature on SC mainly developed during the last decade, the main aim of 
this paper was to explore new perspectives, based on a microeconomic approach. The analysis 
conducted, both theoretical and empirical, helps shed  light on the ongoing SC debate, since it 
investigates the effective role of this capital input in stimulating innovative activity and thus 
economic performance.   
Introducing a nexus of complementarity between R&D and SC, a dynamic theoretical model 
then has shown that when SC is the public component of the impure public good R&D in a 
district of firms, the ‘civic culture’ of the district area where the firm acts is not a sufficient 
explanatory factor to increase the firm investment in social capital, since this investment strictly 
depends also on the economic profitability (private opportunity costs) linked to innovative 
strategies involving firm cooperation. In other words, only if the economic conditions, which 
determine a favourable environment to the investment in the “impure public capital”, improve, 
we may expect an increase of investments in SC. 
Empirical results confirm the nexus of complementarity between R&D and SC/networking 
activities, in assessing the effective role of this capital input in stimulating innovation and, 
consequently, economic growth. We focused our attention on a biomedical industrial district. 
Econometric analysis shows that R&D and SC/networking consistently arise as complementary 
inputs for innovation outputs.  
It is worth noting that the main outcome arising from the theoretical and empirical analysis – 
the pivotal role of complementarity associated between R&D and SC/networking on the input 
side of the production-innovation process – influences the perspective concerning policy action. 
Whenever empirical evidence highlights this keystone complementarity (though further evidence 
is needed to generalise the result), consequently, strong links exist between market and non-
market dynamics relating to firms, and the role for policy actions targeted to SC should be larger 
in spirit. The policy effort should be targeted toward both market and non market (i.e. R&D 
and SC) characteristics taken together, rather than an effort directed to the production of (local) 
public goods (SC) or innovation inputs as independent elements of firm’s specific processes. 
The difference is not purely speculative, but is important as far as policy effectiveness is 
concerned. In fact, we argue that SC/networking dynamics might positively evolve only if the 
private opportunity cost of investing in non-BAU innovation is sufficiently low. Nevertheless, 
this (exogenous) economic incentive works as long as complementarity, as here defined, holds. 
Otherwise, opportunistic behavior concerning cooperation for networking activities may 
  22undermine the development of R&D and innovation, even when economic conditions are 
favourably evolving (i.e. decreasing opportunity costs). Moreover, SC/networking is not a 
sufficient driver, as some authors have suggested, for generating innovative behavior and better 
economic performances, in absence of favourable economic incentives. This perspective leads 
to new research lines, given the necessity of investigating what the opportunity cost threshold 
may be in a specific environment.  
The results of the theoretical model may deserve further empirical analysis. Particularly, it will 
be helpful to compare the accumulation of social capital by firms joining districts situated in two 
different geographic areas characterized by different opportunity costs of investing in the 
impure public capital. 
To conclude, we argue that more attention should be paid to causality links and endogeneity 
when dealing with the issue at both empirical and conceptual levels.  We think that only a joint 
theoretical-empirical effort can provide benefit for the SC framework. Otherwise, there is a risk 
of focussing too much attention on an untested hypothesis as guidance for policymaking. We 
recommend further work on the applied direction, where there is a high possibility of providing 
new evidence stemming from specific and micro-oriented survey studies.  
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(Equation of motion for λ). 
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The sum of the complementary function and the particular integral then constitutes the 
general solution of the complete equation: 
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  27Appendix 2 
(Equation of motion for Ri). 
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The sum of the complementary function and the particular integral then constitutes the 
general solution of the complete equation: 
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Moreover, by setting t=0 in this result, it is easily shown that 
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  28Appendix 3 
 
 
Table A.1 – A comparison between sample and population (year 2000) 
  POPULATION(*) SURVEY 
  Firms Employees Firms Employees 
  N. % N. % N. % N. % 
          
Final  firm  35  50.0 3,114 85.1  18  45.0 1,812 77.2 
Sub-contractor 35  50.0 546 14.9  22  65.0 536 22.8 
Total  70  100.0 3,660 100.0  40  100.0 2,348 100.0 
Source: Baracchi and Bigarelli, 2001 
 
Table A.2 – The distribution of final firms by employees class (year 2000) 
  POPULATION(*) SURVEY 
  Firms Employees Firms Employees 
  N. % N. % N. % N. % 
          
0-49  24  68.5 461 14.8  12  66.8 184 10.2 
50-249  7  20.0 692 22.2  3  16.6 304 16.8 
>249  4  11.5 1,961 63.0  3  16.6 1,324 73.1 
Total  35  100.0 3,114 100.0  18  100.0 1,812 100.0 
Source: Baracchi and Bigarelli, 2001 
 
 
Table A.3 – The distribution of  sub-contractors by employees class (year 2000) 
  POPULATION(*) SURVEY 
  Firms Employees Firms Employees 
  N. % N. % N. % N. % 
          
0-9  11 31.4 50  9.2  7  31.8 23  4.3 
10-19  15  42.9 196 35.9  9  40.9 120 22.4 
>20  9  25.7 300 54.9  6  27.3 393 73.3 
Total  35  100.0 546 100.0  22  100.0 536 100.0 
Source: Baracchi and Bigarelli, 2001 
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